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Dijker (2014) has recently proposed a
novel approach to consciousness, accord-
ing to which the primary function of con-
sciousness is producing states of objectivity.
States of objectivity are defined (p.2) as
“internally represent[ing] objects and their
dispositional properties . . . in relatively
stable, accurate, increasingly complete,
perceiver-independent ways, unbiased by
specific needs, motives, and anticipation of
instrumental aspects and rewards.” I think
that the author has made a very import
point, and that the principal objectivity
of (some kind of) conscious states is a
major issue unfortunately missed in most
contemporary theories of consciousness.
However, I also think that the publica-
tion of Dijker (2014) is only a first step,
and that the view of consciousness as the
capacity to produce states of objectivity
needs further development. I hope that the
following comments can contribute to this
development.
First of all, I would argue that although
Dijker’s (2014) approach is original, it has
predecessors. Particularly, this was what
Franz Brentano (Brentano, 2008; 1st Ed.
1874) meant in his famous definition of
consciousness as intentionality: each con-
scious state, according to Brentano, is
“about” some object, which is outside con-
sciousness. This object, therefore, does not
belong to consciousness, and in this sense,
it is objective.
Second, there are cases that quite obvi-
ously contradict the above definition of
consciousness. Thus, pain experience
is self-evidently not objective; there-
fore, according to the definition, it is
not a conscious phenomenon. Such
conclusion would have far-going practical
consequences. It may imply, for instance,
that having sufficiently strong muscle
relaxants, surgeons do not need analgesics
during their interventions. Whether sur-
gical patients would be enthusiastic about
this approach to consciousness, can be
questioned.
However, this point is much less seri-
ous than it appears. The contradicting
cases simply indicate that the theory
should let down its level of generaliza-
tion. Possibly, objectivity characterizes not
all states of consciousness but only a par-
ticular class of such states, e.g., higher-
order consciousness of Genaro (1996) and
Rosenthal (2004), access consciousness of
Block (2005, 2007), secondary conscious-
ness of Edelman (1989), or cognitive con-
sciousness of Panksepp (2005). The merits
of Dijker’s proposal will not be dimin-
ished by the fact that his ideas are related
to an important subtype of conscious
phenomena and not to each of them.
There is a more serious problem, how-
ever. The question remains open where
the states of objectivity can come from.
If I understand the author correctly, he
believes that play behavior can result
in conceiving of some aspects of the
environment (e.g., children or sexual part-
ner) as “fragile,” vulnerable and care-
requesting. This hypothesis, however, does
not clarify how the notions of vulnerabil-
ity and care can help us to explain the
phenomenon of objectivity. Relationships
with vulnerable entities are emotional
through and through. Everybody can only
think on one’s own small children, pets
or just porcelain vessels. According to
author’s definition of states of objectivity,
our interaction with these objects should
be relatively stable, neutral, perceiver-
independent, unbiased by our needs and
motives. This is, of course, not the case.
Let us approach this issue from a differ-
ent point. What is objective? Some aspects
of Dijker’s (2014) definition, such as accu-
racy and completeness, are difficult to test.
Somebody must have standards of accu-
racy and completeness to determine in
what degree my ideas of the world are
accurate and complete. This being can
be either God or other humans. In the
former case the standards are absolute,
but, unfortunately, we cannot know any-
thing about them, because we are lacking
divine knowledge. In the latter case we
have to admit that also others’ conscious
states can be as little objective as ours,
because other people have their own bias-
ing factors. Thus, understood objectivity is
nothing more than intersubjectivity. This
is how the term “objectivity” is defined,
e.g., in the test theory: a psychological
test is objective if different test admin-
istrators and test evaluators come to the
same conclusion. However, when Dijker
speaks about objectivity and conscious-
ness he obviously means much more than
mere agreement between several (perhaps
equally subjective) observers.
The matter does not get better if we
suggest that objective features are such
that “really exist” independently of any
observer. This definition cannot be opera-
tionalized. How can we test that the feature
F really exists if, by definition, such testing
must not involve any observer?
On the other hand, other aspects of
the definition can be more useful: inde-
pendence of the perceiver’s needs, motives
and (I would add) his/her particular
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anatomical and physiological organiza-
tion. The word “object” (whose derivate
is “objectivity”) has quite similar etymol-
ogy in virtually all European languages
(Romanic, Germanic, and Slavonic). It
means something that I have thrown in
front ofme, and now it stands there oppos-
ing to me. This, again, leads us back
to Brentano who claimed that a mental
state, in contrast to a physical state, nec-
essarily contains (or “is directed toward”)
something that is outside this state (its
“intentional object”).
But how can I perform such an act
of throwing outwards something (which,
originally, belonged to me) in such a man-
ner that it now appears against me, as
a thing which is different from me and
resists me? To do this operation, I need a
tool.
The world as typically perceived by
an animal is not an objective world in
any sense of this word. Rather, it is
an ecological world (“Lebenswelt”), var-
iously described by biologists (e.g., von
Uexküll, 1970), psychologists (Gibson,
1979), philosophers (Heidegger, 1963),
and system theorists (Bruineberg and
Rietveld, 2014). Unlike the world of adult
humans, the ecological world does not
contain objects, but constellations of prop-
erties immediately related to an organism.
An apple is not an object; rather, it is some-
thing that I can grasp, take, eat, throw, etc.
A horizontal surface is something where
I can rest and sleep upon. A fence is an
obstacle for my locomotion, which I can
jump over or run around it. Everything is
perceived as “affordance” (Gibson, 1979;
Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014), i.e., in
immediate relation to my capabilities, my
anatomic and physiological composition
and my actual needs.
The situation becomes different as soon
as I use a tool. A tool is an element of
my environment that interacts not only
with my organism, but also with other ele-
ments. The affordances of a banana (it can
be grasped, eaten, etc.) are fully described
in terms of its relation to the organism
(because it is the organism who can grasp
and eat it); but the properties of the stick
used to reach the banana are also described
in terms of its relation to the banana. For
illustration, see Figure 1, in which the for-
mer properties are indicated as A, and the
latter, as B. For example, the stick has to
FIGURE 1 | Relationships between an organism (the ape), its goals (the banana), and tools
(ladder, stock). Using the tools, the organism records the relationships of type B between the tool
and the goal. Thereby, the organism gets the idea that some components in the environment are
related, not only to the organism itself, but also to other components of the environment.
be hard and possibly sharp. We know from
the famous experiments of Köhler (1926)
that some apes tried to reach a banana
using a bundle of hay, but they failed
because hay lacks the necessary property
of hardness. Thus, the organism, to use
a tool, learns that some components of
its environment possess properties which
manifest themselves outside the relation-
ships to this organism, i.e., objective prop-
erties. Given the relations of the A-type
and those of the B-type (see Figure 1),
the relations of the C-type emerge, i.e.,
the knowledge that there is something
in the world, which is not immediately
related to me.
The hardness of the stick as a tool prin-
cipally differs not only from the eatability
of the apple but also from the hardness
of a rock that I could collide with. It is
important that the rock is hard, because
this is why it may hurt me. It is important
that the stick is hard because this is why it
can move the banana. In the former case,
the hardness manifests itself in relation to
me; in the latter case, it manifests itself in
relation to something else.
In other words: what happens if my
organism is removed from the situation?
If I am simply not here? There is no sense
in such a situation to talk about the taste
of an apple (who can taste it?) or the
hardness of a rock (whom can it injury?),
but the stick will remain hard, because its
hardness follows from its interaction with
another component of the environment.
The stick, therefore, is an outside object
whose properties (and, therefore, its very
existence) do not depend on my presence
or absence in the situation.
Now we can pass over to other aspects
of objectivity, i.e., completeness and accu-
racy. How we can know that a property
we perceive as objective (e.g., the hard-
ness of the stick) is relatively complete and
accurate? “By their fruit you will recognize
them,” said Jesus (Matthew 7, 16). This
fruit is the banana: if I was unable to reach
it, this means that I failed to recognize real,
objective properties of the employed tool.
The banana, therefore, is the final criterion
of objectivity: the fact that I can reach my
goal using this tool proves that my percep-
tion of the tool’s properties is sufficiently
complete and accurate.
This is, however, an important critical
point ofmy proposal: if, as I suggest, objec-
tive conscious states are derivate of tool
usage, then our objectivity is only instru-
mental. It still remains in the space of the
available experience.
This is true: my proposal implies that
objectivity cannot be absolute. It cannot
transcend the space between the organ-
ism and the goal of its activity. However,
it can expand this space and even a
simplest tool substantially broadens the
organism’s world view. A new, third com-
ponent emerges between the organism
and its goal, having properties unknown
beforehand.
The space is further expanded when
higher-order tools emerge.Whereas a first-
order tool is a mean to reach a goal, a
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second-order tool is a mean to reach a
first-order tool. Second-order tools can
be used by crows (Taylor et al., 2007)
and monkeys (Evans and Westergaard,
2006), while our ancestors such as Homo
habilis probably possessed tools of very
high orders (Ingold, 1993). When I do not
just use an available element of the envi-
ronment to reach another element (i.e.,
my goal), but rather, I use element A to
make element B, which I need to make
element C, and so forth, and the goal is
only at the end of a very long chain of
tools, then the instrumental background
of objectivity can virtually disappear from
awareness.
The presented view agrees with that
of Dijker’s (2014) at the point that the
ultimate source of objectivity is play.
Play is a necessary predecessor of tool
usage (Huizinga, 1950). In order to use
a component of the external world as
a tool, an animal should first manip-
ulate it without a particular aim, i.e.,
play with it. Moreover, there is a direct
relationship between tool use, language,
and intelligence (e.g., Gibson, 1993; Frey,
2008; Lefebvre, 2013). However, if—as
suggested here—play is only a necessary
but not sufficient stage in the develop-
ment of tool usage, the latter can be
expected to be less broadly spread in
the animal world than the former. In
fact, tool usage is limited to a few ani-
mal orders such as primates and corvi-
dae, while play is observed among many
mammals and birds including ungulates,
carnivorans, parrots, and many others
(Burghardt, 2005); there is even evi-
dence of play in octopus (Kuba et al.,
2006).
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